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The Battered Child Syndrome
JERRY A. RAMSEY
and
BYRON J. LAWLER***
Battered children have long been deprived of the protection of
the law. During the first few years of a child's life, he is under
the care, custody, and control of his parents, and is not in a position
to effectively communicate with anyone outside the family, even
when he needs protection against the family environment. The
unique position of the family in our society excludes outsiders from
helping the child and leaves him at the mercy of his parents.
In the early 1960's, a small group of doctors throughout the
United States began to discuss the dilemma that society has thrust
upon many small children, calling the problem The Battered Child
Syndrome. They described the syndrome as follows:
The Battered Child Syndrome, a clinical condition in young chil-
dren who have received serious physical abuse, is a frequent cause
of permanent injury or death. The Syndrome should be consid-
ered in any child exhibiting evidence of fracture of any bone, sub-
dural hematoma, failure to thrive, soft tissue swelling or skin
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bruising, in any child who dies suddenly, or where the degree and
type of injury is at variance with the history given regarding the
occurrence of the trauma. Psychiatric factors are probably of
prime importance in the pathogenesis of the disorder, but knowl-
edge of these factors is limited. Physicians have a duty and re-
sponsibility to the child to require a full evaluation of the problem
and to guarantee that no expected repetition of the trauma will
be permitted to occur.'
The concern of the doctors was justified. Additional investiga-
tion revealed that a significant number of children were being
abused by their custodians. As doctors learned more about this
phenomenon, they began to write articles in medical journals de-
scribing the factors and symptoms that a doctor should recognize as
part of the Syndrome.2 The thrust of many of these articles is
of a clinical nature, but virtually all also highlight the need for
social remedies to the problem. As stated in Helping The Battered
Child and His Family, these articles seek:
1. To suggest a child abuse treatment program which, if imple-
mented, should prove helpful in either the large or small com-
munity.
2. To demonstrate that many people of a variety of backgrounds
and experiences can be helpful both to the abused child and
his family.
3. To provide these individuals with a practical "how to" and
"what to do" approach to the many problems that arise when
one attempts to provide help.3
The California legislature recognized that the problem involved
in the syndrome was that children are helpless to protect them-
selves; their guardians need psychiatric help; and that child abuse
continues until such protection and help are provided. To remedy
this situation, California enacted a reporting statute. In an at-
tempt to make the statute fulfill its purpose, the statute has been
modified five times since the initial act was made law. The present
statute4 broadens the class of persons required to make reports
so as to include physicians, dentists, residents, interns, chiroprac-
1. C. Kempe, M.D., F. Silverman, M.D., B. Steele, M.D., W. Droegemuel-
ler, M.D. and H. Silver, M.D., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A.
105 (1972).
2. Id.
3. R. Helfer, M.D., C. Kemper, M.D., HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND
HIS FAMILY (1972).
4. CAL. PaAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1973).
,ters, religious practitioners, registered nurses, and superintendents
and principals of schools. The persons within the reporting class
must make an appropriate report to the police authority when they
observe a minor who has physical injuries which appear to have
been inflicted upon him by other than accidental means. 5
The problem is -that the professionals who are required by law
to make reports neglect to follow the law; and the child continues
to be battered, beaten, and abused. A letter from the Orange
County Grand Jury to the Orange County Board of Supervisors
indicates the severity of the situation and the lack of organization
within the county to combat the Syndrome:
The Grand Jury is acutely aware of individual cases of child abuse
going on at this moment, in this county; of the torment of parents
engaged in such behavior; of the frustrations experienced by pro-
fessionals who repeatedly encounter abuse and who feel there is
no meaningful action to be taken and, finally, of the grave social
consequences of continuing to ignore the problem.6
One possible solution to the widespread failure to report is to
impose civil liability upon people who are required by the statute
to make the report. In addition to criminal liability, the added
civil liability has the advantage of becoming a financial deterrent
to noncompliance with the statute while it helps to pay for the
injuries sustained by the child.
However, until just recently, there was a substantial question
as to whether a person would be civilly liable to the injured minor
if he did not make the report required by law. This question has
been partially resolved by a recent lawsuit brought against several
doctors in the County of San Luis Obispo, California.7 The facts
creating the lawsuit follow.
Thomas Eugene Robison was born on November 2, 1969, in San
Luis Obispo, California. He was a normal, healthy baby in all re-
spects. He lived a normal life, as we know it, the first four months
of his existence while he resided with his natural father; but early
in 1970, his father left and another man began living in the home.
On April 28, 1970, Tommy was brought to the Arroyo Grande
'Hospital in Arroyo Grande with a skull fracture, contusions, blood
blisters on his penis, and many old bruises. The admitting doctor
suspected child abuse and questioned the mother about the cause
of the various injuries. The history given was inconsistent with
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
6. See Appendix A.
7. Robison v. Elvin Wical, M.D. et al., Civil No. 37607 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
San Luis Obispo, filed Sept. 4, 1970) (hereinafter cited Robison).
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the injuries observed. The mother's explanation of the skull frac-
ture was that the boy had fallen off a bed. The blood blisters
were explained as insect bites.
The medical records indicated that the explanation given was
not believed by the admitting doctor. No further action was taken,
however, to determine how the child received the injuries. No re-
port was made to any governmental agency. The child was re-
leased to his mother on May 1, 1970.
On May 8th, Tommy was again brought to Arroyo Grande Com-
munity Hospital by his mother. Again, the doctor admitting the
child to the hospital suspected the mother of child abuse. Further
investgation by the doctors and nurses disclosed that the child's
left arm was swollen and discolored between the forearm and fin-
gertips. The fingertips of the left hand were blistered. There was
obvious swelling on the back of the child's head, puncture wounds
about his neck, and bruises and welt marks along the upper back.
There were other bruises on the torso and lower extremities of
the child that appeared to be in various stages of healing.
The attending doctor and nurses intended to keep the child out
of the dangerous environment of his parent, but the mother and
her boyfriend took the child from the hospital against medical ad-
vice. They transported Tommy to San Luis Obispo where he was
admitted to Sierra Vista Hospital.8
The child was released from the hospital in San Luis Obispo on
May 11, 1970. The discharge summary indicated that the child's
hospitalization had been uneventful .and that the child had been
retained regarding possible child abuse, but was being discharged
"in the hope that that was not so."
No reports were made to the governmental agencies in San Luis
Obispo regarding Tommy's admission to the hospital there. A re-
port had been made to the Arroyo Grande police by a doctor from
Arroyo Grande Community Hospital. The police began an investi-
gation, but did not make any report to the County Juvenile Proba-
tion Department or take any real action with regard to the report.9
8. Sierra Vista Hospital, San Luis Obispo, Medical Records No. 70-
1885 (Patient Tommy Robison) Admitted 5/9/70-Discharged 5/11/70.
9. The Police Department was named in the original suit, but was
dismissed from the suit on settlement.
Tommy remained with his mother until May 27, 1970. On the
morning of that date he was taken to a doctor in Arroyo Grande,
California. He examined the child and later testified that he did
not find any evidence of injury on the child at the time of exami-
nation. However, he did take an x-ray of the child's lower extrem-
ities which revealed a fracture of the long bone of the leg.
Later that same day, the child was admitted to Arroyo Grande
Community Hospital. At the time of this admission, he was not
breathing and his pulse was weak and irregular. His head was
swollen; the soft spot, or the fontenal, was bulging and hard; there
was no pulse in the brain. The child's eyes did not respond to
light and he did not react to any pain stimulus. There were exten-
sive bruises over the left side of his head, under his chin, on his
torso, legs and back. He appeared to be dead. The child was given
emergency care that restored his vital signs, but the injuries sus-
tained resulted in extensive and permanent brain damage.
The doctors who failed to report the Battered Child Syndrome
were included as defendants in the suit on the theory of negligence
per se. They had a duty to the child to report the symptoms of
child abuse; failure to make the report was a breach of the duty
to exercise due care owed to the minor child; the child was a mem-
ber of the group which the statute sought to protect; and failure
to report was the direct and proximate cause of the damages sus-
tained by the child. These legal problems are discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
THE DOCTORS HAD A DUTY TO THE CHILD TO REPORT
THE SYMPTOMS OF CHILD ABUSE
The basis for creating the duty is found in the Penal Code. In
pertinent part, the applicable code section reads:
§ 11161.5 Injuries apparently inflicted upon minor by other than
accidental means; report by physician, teacher, social worker, etc.
(a) In any case in which a minor is brought to a physician and
surgeon, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, or relig-
ious practitioner for diagnosis, examination or treatment, or is un-
der his charge or care, or in any case in which a minor is observed
by any registered nurse when in the employ of a public health
agency, school, or school district and when no physician and sur-
geon, resident, or intern is present, by any superintendent, any
supervisor of child welfare and attendance, or any certificated pu-
pil personnel employee of any public or private school system .or
any principal of any public or private school, by any teacher of
any public or private school, by any licensed day care worker,
by an administrator of a public or private summer day camp or
child care center, or by any social worker, and it appears to the
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physician and surgeon, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiro-
practor, religious practitioner, registered nurse, school superin-
tendent, supervisor of child welfare and attendance, certificated
pupil personnel employee, school principal, teacher, licensed day
care worker, by an administrator of a public or private summer
day camp or child care center or social worker from observation
of the minor that the minor has physical injury or injuries which
appear to have been inflicted upon him by other than accidental
means by any person, he shall report such fact by telephone and
in writing, within 36 hours, to both the local policy authority
having jurisdiction and to the juvenile probation department; or,
in the alternative, either to the county welfare department, or to
the county health department. The report shall state, if known,
the name of the minor, his whereabouts and the character and
extent of the injuries.
Whenever it is brought to the attention of a director of a county
welfare department or health department that a minor has phy-
sical injury or injuries which appear to have been inflicted upon
him by other than accidental means by any person, he shall file
a report without delay with the local police authority having jur-
isdiction and to the juvenile probation department as provided in
this section.
No person shall incur any civil or criminal liability as a result
of making any report authorized by this section.'0
Prior to the Robison case, there had not been any civil cases in
California directly concerning the issue of a duty to report under
a particular statute. An early Ohio case dealing with the question
of negligence of a physician based on non-compliance with a crim-
inal statute was the case of Jones v. Stanko." This case involved
a doctor who had failed to report smallpox to an appropriate state
agency. The servant of the person who was afflicted with small-
pox contracted the contagious disease and died. The servant's
widow subsequently brought an action against the treating physi-
cian, basing her contention of negligence on the fact that the doc-
tor failed to report the contagious disease to the state agency. The
trial court refused to instruct the jury on the reporting issue and a
verdict was returned in favor of the doctor. The Appellate Court
reversed on appeal, holding that the servant's death was a harm
which the reporting statute was designed to prevent by giving peo-
ple warning of the existence of the disease; that the failure to make
the report might be a proximate cause of the death.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1973).
11. 118 Ohio 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
The case of Medlin v. Bloom,12 involved a situation where an
infant became blind because of an eye disease. The Massachusetts
law required the attending physician to immediately report such
eye disease cases to the State Board of Health. The statute was
designed to insure that newly born infants who showed signs of
such disease receive immediate care in order that their sight might
be saved, and to prevent their blindness from becoming a burden
on the State. An action was brought against the doctor because
of his failure to report. The trial court refused to give an instruc-
tion on the issue of whether or not the doctor's failure or delay
in making the statutorily required report was evidence of negli-
gence. The Massachusetts Appellate Court reversed, indicating
that it was for the jury to determine whether the failure of a re-
port was negligence and whether that negligence was a proximate
cause of the blindness.' 3
The facts of the Robison case are very similar to the facts of
the two cases as stated above. In all three cases, the reporting
statute was enacted to prevent a particular harm, and the failure
to make the report resulted in that particular harm. Both the
Ohio and the Massachusetts cases held that the reporting statute
in such a situation gave rise to a civil duty to the injured party.
Given the California reporting statute, a similar result should be
anticipated in a case like Robison.
The next problem regarding duty is the time when the duty
arises. People v. Jackson, 4 deals with criminal liability under the
reporting statute, but gives some insight into the Syndrome, dis-
cusses the type of duty that the professional is required to dis-
charge, and suggests the time when the duty arises. The court
recognized that The Battered Child Syndrome consists of several
elements, and listed them as follows:
1. The child is usually under three years of age;
2. There is evidence of bone injury at different times;
3. There are subdural hematomas with or without skull fractures;
4. There is a seriously injured child who does not have a history
that fits the injuries;
5. There is evidence of soft-tissue injury; and
6. There is evidence of neglect. 15
These criteria were taken out of medical records and incorporated
into the court's decision. Thomas Eugene Robison had injuries
12. 320 Mass. 201, 119 N.E. 773 (1918).
13. Id.
14. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
15. Id. at 506, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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that fit all the criteria for child abuse as discussed in the Jackson
opiton.
The Jackson case did not end with the listing of criteria, how-
ever. The court went on to hold that the doctor was not required
to make an accusation of child abuse, but was only required to
report the symptoms of the Battered Child Syndrome. The court
in Jackson emphasized that the symptoms are easily detectable by
a professional person and further intimated that the duty arises
on discovery of the symptoms of abuse. The Court explained the
problem in the following language:
A finding as in this case of the 'battered child syndrome' is not
an opinion by the doctor [discovering and/or reporting doctor]
as to whether any particular person has done anything, but, as
this doctor indicated, 'it would take thousands of children to have
the severity and number and degree of injuries that this child had
over the span of the time we had' by accidental means. In other
words, the 'battered child syndrome' simply indicates that a child
found with the type of injuries outlined above has not suffered
those injuries by accidental means. This conclusion is based upon
an extensive study of the subject by medical science. The ad-
ditional finding that the injuries were probably occasioned by
someone who is ostensibly caring for the child is simply a con-
clusion based upon logic and reason. Only someone regularly
'caring' for the child has the continuing opportunity to inflict these
types of injuries; an isolated contact with a vicious stranger would
not result in this pattern of successive injuries stretching through
several months.16
Thus, it appears that the doctor owes a duty to the minor child
to make a report of The Battered Child Syndrome at the time the
doctor discovers the symptoms. There is no requirement that the
doctor draw the conclusion that the injuries were sustained by
child abuse before the duty arises.
THE FAILURE TO REPORT THE SYMPTOMS OF THE BATTERED CHILD
SYNDROME IS A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE
Negligence requires that there be a breach of the duty of due
care. The situation in the Robison case is that the doctor omitted,
rather than committed, a certain act. Evidence Code Section 669
covers just that type of situation.'7
16. Id. at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
17. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1973).
The Code provides that a failure of a person to exercise due care
is presumed if (1) he violated a statute of a public entity; (2)
the violation proximately caused the death or injury; (3) the death
or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the stat-
ute was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the
injury was one of the class of persons for whose protection the
statute was adopted.' 8 The Robison case factually comports with
this statute's requirements in that (1) the doctor violated a penal
code section; (2) the failure to report allowed the injuries to ex-
acerbate, finally resulting in serious mental retardation; (3) the
recurrence of child abuse was the harm that the statute intended
to prevent; and (4) Tommy was a member of the class of persons
within statutory protection. It is suggested that in light of Evi-
dence Code Section 669,19 the failure to report is a breach of the
duty of due care.
THE FAILURE TO REPORT THE SYNDROME IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE CHILD'S INJURIES
The case of Whinery v. Southern Pacific Company20 handled the
problem of proximate cause in the following manner. The situa-
tion involved a Southern Pacific train which was exceeding the
statutory speed limit at the time of the accident. The rule of the
case was that, if the defendant violated the statute without excuse,
and the violation continued up to the moment of damage, then,
that conduct would not only constitute negligence as a matter of
law, but would be deemed to be the proximate cause of the acci-
dent.
The application of the presumption of proximate cause makes
sense in a battered child case because of the repetitive nature of
the abuse. The legal issue presented is whether the liability of
the person failing to report is superceded by the intentional acts
of the custodians of the child when they abuse the child on re-
peated occasions after the abuse is observed; i.e. does the interven-
ing criminal act cut off the tort liability. California has used the
rules set forth in Section 449 of the Restatement of Torts in the
case of Vesely v. Sager, in this situation.21 The section provides
in substance that if the likelihood that a third person may act in
a particular manner is the hazard which makes the actor negligent,
even a criminal act does not prevent the actor from being liable
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 6 Cal. App. 3d 126, 85 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1970).
21. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
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for the harm caused thereby. 22
Application of these rules to the instant fact situation shows that
the likelihood -of a third person (the child's custodian) continuing
the child abuse is exactly the hazard -that the reporting statute
is designed to prevent. Thus, under the rules of Vesely, the inter-
vening acts of the parents do not break the chain of causation and
the doctors should be civilly liable to the minor child.
CONCLUSION
Why should doctors and other persons identified in the statute
be required to make reports of battered children? The doctor, the
practitioner, and the teacher hold unique positions in our society;
they are able to intimately observe the child outside his family
environment. They, more easily than anyone else, can identify the
clinical indicia of the Battered Child Syndrome.
Society through the legislature has mandated that these children
be protected. The parents obviously are not psychologically capa-
ble of protecting them, since they themselves are the ones in inflict-
ing the injuries. Thus, the welfare of the child can only be protected
by an objective unbiased third party who is outside the familial
environment.
Has the reporting statute resulted in the implementation of the
legislative mandate? Unfortunately, the criminal sanctions are not
of sufficient severity, nor is the incident of prosecution of sufficient
frequency to answer in the affirmative.
The number of "Tommys" in our institutions cry out for an effec-
tive method to encourage those who fail to report to take a hard
look at their dereliction of duty. A civil tort action, based on
negligence per se and tried before a cross section of society who
can impose an effective dollar penalty, will provide such encour-
agement. With the penalty measured in the tens and hundreds
of thousands of dollars, the inconvenience of reporting and becom-
ing involved will shrink into insignificance. It is a language that
most professionals understand. Only then will the legislative man-
date be effected. Only then will the "Tommys" of our society have
the opportunity for a childhood free of physical abuse.
22. Id. at 164, 486 P.2d 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. 630.
